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Design and Implementation of Virtual Private Services
Abstract
Large scale distributed applications such as electronic commerce and online marketplaces combine
network access with multiple storage and computational elements. The distributed responsibility for
resource control creates new security and privacy issues, which are exacerbated by the complexity of the
operating environment. In order to handle policies at multiple locations, the usual tools available (firewalls
and compartmented file storage) get to be used in ways that are clumsy and prone to failure.
We propose a new approach, virtual private services. Our approach relies on two functional divisions.
First, we split policy specification and policy enforcement, providing local autonomy within the constraints
of the global security policy. Second, we create virtual security domains, each with its own security policy.
Every domain has an associated set of privileges and permissions restricting it to the resources it needs
to use and the services it must perform. Virtual private services ensure security and privacy policies are
adhered to through coordinated policy enforcement points. We describe our architecture and a prototype
implementation, and present a preliminary performance evaluation confirming that our overhead of policy
enforcement using is small.
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Abstract

were conﬁned to a single computer, the application programmer could rely on the host operating system to support these requirements. The advent of the Internet has introduced new challenges for applications with non-trivial
access-control requirements. In particular, various network
access-control mechanisms such as ﬁrewalls are largely
oblivious to applications (and vice versa), while ﬁle-access
privileges associated solely with users may not allow for
sufﬁciently ﬁne-grained access control to handle safety issues related to untrusted active content (such as JavaScript
applets). In this paper, we introduce the concept of a virtual
private service (VPS), which captures in a policy speciﬁcation the complete access-control requirements of a service.
This single policy speciﬁcation can then be used by enforcement mechanisms in hosts, routers, ﬁrewalls and elsewhere
to produce a consistent environment for the service.

Large scale distributed applications such as electronic
commerce and online marketplaces combine network access with multiple storage and computational elements. The
distributed responsibility for resource control creates new
security and privacy issues, which are exacerbated by the
complexity of the operating environment. In order to handle policies at multiple locations, the usual tools available
(ﬁrewalls and compartmented ﬁle storage) get to be used in
ways that are clumsy and prone to failure.
We propose a new approach, virtual private services.
Our approach relies on two functional divisions. First, we
split policy speciﬁcation and policy enforcement, providing
local autonomy within the constraints of the global security
policy. Second, we create virtual security domains, each
with its own security policy. Every domain has an associated set of privileges and permissions restricting it to the
resources it needs to use and the services it must perform.
Virtual private services ensure security and privacy policies are adhered to through coordinated policy enforcement
points. We describe our architecture and a prototype implementation, and present a preliminary performance evaluation conﬁrming that our overhead of policy enforcement
using is small.

To illustrate virtual private services, let us look at an
example. Consider some web services run on a virtual
web server consisting of tens or hundreds of machines in
a server “farm”, with co-located auxiliary services such as
a database, credit card transaction support, and web-mail
service. Figure 1 shows the components of such a system,
without elaborating on the replicas of each component used
in a full-scale implementation (e.g.,, multiple servers per
physical location, and replicated physical locations, each
with a database replica and a credit card support system).
Typically, the conﬁguration of such a system is static. By
this, we mean that the administrator conﬁgures each component independently, and depends on the correctness of the
individual policies to enforce a system-wide policy for any
particular user or class of users. There is no coordination
among the nodes in the system, nor is there any coherent
relationship between the network access control (achieved
with ﬁrewalls and routers) and the node access control. The
application components thus become very difﬁcult to manage effectively, and misconﬁgurations and other adminis-

1 Introduction
Security is an application-dependent property, with some
applications requiring very little assistance, while others require considerable infrastructure to support their privacy,
integrity and availability requirements. When applications
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plex policies must be expressed in a variety of different
ways. For example, consider again the network shown in
Figure 1. Assuming there is a security policy barring improper access to the credit card database, the question is
how to best architect a system that can enforce this policy.
The ﬁrst obvious step is a ﬁrewall rule that blocks access from the outside. However, we also need to guard
against attacks originating from the ﬁrewall-protected part
of the network, either by insiders or from inside machines
that have been compromised. Accordingly, the credit card
database may have its own conﬁguration and policy rules
blocking most access from “inside” machines. Indeed, it
may be protected by its own packet ﬁlter or ﬁrewall. However, not all users that can legitimately access those “inside”
machines should necessarily be trusted. Accordingly, additional access rules may be needed as well. These may
be lists of cryptographic credentials to be accepted, or they
may be distributed ﬁrewall rules [13, 4], etc. For that matter,
the database system may itself have access control mechanisms that need to be conﬁgured.
It is clearly impractical to try to conﬁgure each of these
systems separately. While current tools can easily distribute
policy ﬁles, the deeper problem — ensuring consistent access policies, across many different systems — is far more
difﬁcult. It is this problem that we are addressing. Our
task is further complicated when enforcement must be split
across different components. For example, a rule that says
“user A may access database column B on server C when
coming from machine D via IPsec” should be speciﬁed in
one place. Enforcement, however, could be split between a
ﬁrewall that permits access to the database port from D and
a ﬁrewall rule on D that recognizes A’s credentials, while
enforcement of access restrictions to particular ﬁelds must
be done in the database server itself.
One attempt to solve this problem in a limited domain is
the Firmato [3] ﬁrewall language. Firmato is a high-level
language for specifying ﬁrewall policies. The administrator speciﬁes a policy and a network topology; the policy
is then compiled into rule-sets for the different ﬁrewalls
(which may be from different vendors), and distributed to
each ﬁrewall protecting the domain described in the topology. While this is certainly a step in the right direction —
a single policy statement can simultaneously control several different ﬁrewalls — it is limited to a single application
class. As noted above, complex — i.e.,realistic — security
policies need to simultaneously control many different types
of applications. Furthermore, the policies must be enforceable without the co-operation of the applications, since they
may be subverted.
We can thus list our requirements for an effective, multilayer security mechanism. First, the input language must
be rich and extensible, in order to be able to express a wide
variety of policies, for a wide variety of devices and appli-

File Server

CGI

Local FS

Remote FS

Inside

Outside

chroot()

Credit Card DB

Figure 1. Current general architecture of distributed application clusters.

trative errors creep in [12, 21]. The causes can range from
the difﬁculty of managing local components, the difﬁculty
of managing local scale, or the difﬁculty of coordinating
across sites and administrators. Such systems call for an approach that can ensure consistent access-control policies, as
well as meet application-speciﬁc requirements using shared
resources such as hosts and the network.
Virtual private services are distributed applications
which require coordination among clients, servers, and networks to deliver a reliable, secure service to clients. The
name is intended to capture the combination of ideas from
the virtual private networks used to segregate groups of
nodes, and the virtual machine models used to control resources in host operating systems. Our new contribution
to this problem is designing and building a system architecture for a single, ubiquitous security policy that will be
enforced throughout the system (nodes, networks, etc.) to
meet access-control requirements. Thus, in the web server
scenario we sketched earlier, network and host resource access are managed consistently. For example, if an application or user are not permitted to access a service locally, they
are prevented from accessing the same service remotely.

2 Motivation
Large distributed systems cannot be administered one
machine at a time. This is not, of course, news to system
administrators. Many tools (e.g.,ASD [15]) have been built
to ease the task of administering multiple computers. However, for the most part, these tools have been concerned with
ﬁle management and synchronization/distribution, rather
than policies. Policy conﬁguration ﬁles can be centrally
administered, but this is more a side-effect than a basic
premise of the distribution tools. The problem is that com2
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cations. Second, the input language must be high-level, to
avoid unnecessary device-speciﬁc semantics. Third, there
must be a reliable compilation and distribution mechanism that will distribute the policy to all relevant network
nodes. Finally, the policy must be completely enforceable
by trusted components alone (dedicated nodes, operating
system kernels, etc.), without the cooperation of user-level
processes on marginally-trusted machines. However, the
deﬁnition of a trusted component should be extensible such
that a ﬁner-grain policy could be enforced under certain assumptions (e.g.,a database that enforces access restrictions
to speciﬁc columns). Note that proving the enforceability
of a given policy in a speciﬁc system is a hard theoretical
problem; rather than address it, we adopt a pragmatical approach. Our system accomplishes these goals.

Host2

FS View2

Web Server
CGI1
CGI2

Network Layer

FS View1

File Server
FS View1
FS View2

Host3
Network Layer

File Server

Network Layer

Host1

Data Base
DB View1
DB View2

Figure 3. With virtual private services, clients
are granted access only to the resources they
require to accomplish their task.

3 Architecture
3.1 Separation of Management and Enforcement

to that service, so no unneeded policy state is maintained at
the various access points. In our architecture, we implement
policy management with the KeyNote [6] trust-management
system to express and distribute low-level security policy.
Policy enforcement is carried out by an augmented host operating system, into which we have inserted several hooks
for policy enforcement.
Figure 3 demonstrates virtual private services in the context of a web server application. A CGI script running as
part of a web server is only given access to speciﬁc subtrees of local and remote ﬁle systems, a part of a database,
and can form network connections only to the machines that
host the remote ﬁle system and database.
The VPS approach offers several beneﬁts. First, it is
scalable because policy enforcement is done in a distributed
fashion by the access points, avoiding the bottlenecks of
a centralized policy server that has to be engaged at policy evaluation/enforcement time. It is ﬂexible, since maintenance of policies is centralized and coordinated across
different applications. Policy modiﬁcations automatically
propagate to the enforcement points, simplifying the task of
administration and management of individual devices and
applications. Finally, the VPS approach allows for policy
consistency: every service added remains consistent with
the central security policy. New services cannot diverge
from the existing policies.

The problems we discussed in the previous two sections
are exhibited by practically all existing security architectures, and originate from the independent nature of each service. Every application has a different notion of a security
policy, performs access control according to that speciﬁcation, and is oblivious to the security policies of other applications. This often causes conﬁguration problems which
lead to security violations.
Policy

Host 1
Policy
File System

Host N
Policy

Policy
Data Base

File System

...
Policy
Other

Policy
Network

Policy
Other

Policy
Network

Figure 2. Policy ﬂows from a central speciﬁcation point to various services. Only the
policy rules relevant to a speciﬁc service are
pulled to that service. No redundant policy
state is kept at the access points.

3.2 Policy Translation and Composition

Virtual private services are a new approach to these challenges. Global security policies are speciﬁed for services,
while enforcement of these policies remains distributed, local to the resource access points. Figure 2 shows how policy
is managed in this scheme. The policy ﬂows from a central
speciﬁcation point to the various services. Only the policy rules that are relevant to each speciﬁc service are pulled

For our architecture to operate across enforcement
boundaries and for policy to be globally enforceable, we
include “referral” primitives, ﬁrst introduced in STRONGMAN [14]; this is simply a reference to a decision made
by another enforcement point (typically lower in the proto3
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Authorizer: ADMINISTRATOR_KEY
Licensees: USER_A
Conditions: ((app_domain == "db access") &&
(db_column == "column B") &&
(permissions == "FULL_ACCESS") &&
(dst_addr == "Server C") &&
(src_address == "Host D") &&
(ipsec_result == "YES")) -> "permit";

Authorizer: ADMINISTRATOR_KEY
Licensees: ANY_USER
Conditions: ((app_domain == "ftp access") &&
(directory == "/ftpdir/*") &&
(permissions == "READ") &&
(dst_addr == "BOB")) -> "permit";

Figure 6. Speciﬁcation for an FTP policy.
Figure 4. A simpliﬁed representation of the
VPS policies for the database example from
Section 2.

Authorizer: ADMINISTRATOR_KEY
Licensees: WEB_ADM
Conditions: ((app_domain == "fs access") &&
(directory == "/www*") &&
(permissions == "FULL_ACCESS")) -> "permit";

Authorizer: ADMINISTRATOR_KEY
Licensees: ANY_USER
Conditions: ((app_domain == "net access") &&
(src_addr == "ALICE") &&
(dst_addr == "BOB")) -> "permit";

Figure 7. Policy giving the web administrator
full access to the WWW directories.

in Figure 9. The ﬁrst part of the policy guarantees that
the script can only connect to either host2 or host3 from
host1, the second part will limit ﬁle accesses to directories
that only contain data for the script, and last part guarantees
will only allow the script to access its own database records.
The combination of these simple policies assures the properties of the service provided by the CGI script. These subpolicies are independently enforced by the ﬁrewall, ﬁlesystem, and database server respectively.
Finally, in Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8 we give examples of
simple policies that deﬁne virtual private services for different users and applications. Administrators can customize
services in their system by specifying such policies and
guarantee consistency across all system components.

Figure 5. Sample policy for allowing network
connections between two machines, from Alice to Bob.

col stack, but more generally at another enforcement point).
This primitive allows us to perform policy composition
at enforcement time; decisions made by one enforcement
mechanism (e.g., IPsec) are made available to higher-level
enforcement mechanisms and can be taken into consideration when making an access-control decision.
To accomplish this, all that is necessary is a channel to
propagate this information across enforcement boundaries.
In our system, this is done on a case-by-case basis. For
example, in our present system IPsec information can be
propagated higher in the protocol stack by suitably modifying the Unix getsockopt(2) system call; in the case of a web
server and SSL, the information is readily available to the
web server through the SSL data structures.

3.4 Evaluation
While the architectural discussion is largely qualitative,
some estimates of the system performance are useful. To
accomplish this we tested our system with the services for
network connection, ﬁle system access and web access, deﬁned by the sample policies presented in Section 3.3. Even
though the sample services are simple, small scale cases,
we believe they provide an adequate picture of the base
performance of the system. We are currently working on
more complex and larger scale scenarios for a more complete evaluation.
In our ﬁrst experiment we wanted to explore the effects
that our architecture has on network performance. For this
we set up a simple client to consecutive form TCP connections to a server machine (over 100Mbps Ethernet). The
average slowdown due to our access control layer was less
than %3 (50.4ms vs. 51.8ms). It took 50.4ms to form the
connections on a standard OpenBSD system and 51.8ms

3.3 Sample Policies
In Section 2 we described an example of a policy for a
user accessing a speciﬁc column in a database with some
additional network constraints. Figure 4 shows how such
a policy is described in our system. In this example, the
administrator authorizes user A to have full access to the
database column B, provided they access it on server C
coming from host D over IPsec.
In Section 3.1 we gave a brief example of a service provided by a CGI script (Figure 3). The script requires limited
access to the ﬁle system (remote and local) and the database,
and should not get all the privileges of the web server. We
accomplish this by setting up a distributed policy as seen
4
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Authorizer: ADMINISTRATOR_KEY
Licensees: ANY_USER
Conditions: ((app_domain == "web access") &&
(directory == "/www/webpages/*") &&
(permissions == "READ") &&
(dst_addr == "WEB_SERVER") &&
(dst_port == "80")) -> "permit";

geneous systems, multiple layers of security mechanisms,
and great complexity; in that sense, it differs from research
focused on single nodes, homogeneous nodes making up a
distributed system, or single protocols.
The Flask system [20] extends the idea of capabilities
and access control lists with the more general notion of a
security policy. Flask relies on a security server for policy
decisions and on an object server for enforcement. Every
object in the system has an associated security identiﬁer.
Requests coming from objects are bound by the permissions
associated with their security identiﬁer. Flask does not address the issue of cooperation amongst clients, servers and
networks to deliver reliable and secure services to clients.
A different approach relies on the notion of system-call
interposition. Systems like Janus [10], Consh [2], and Mapbox [1], operate at user level and conﬁne applications by
ﬁltering access to system calls. To accomplish this they rely
on ptrace(2), the /proc ﬁle system, and special shared libraries. Another category of systems like Tron [5], SubDomain [8] and others go a step further. They intercept system calls inside the kernel and use policy engines to decide
whether to permit the call or not. Our architecture focuses
on separation of policy enforcement and speciﬁcation, and
support for distributed compartmentalized services.
Capabilities and access control lists are the most common mechanisms operating systems use for access control.
Such mechanisms expand the UNIX security model and are
implemented in several popular operating systems, such as
Solaris and Windows NT [9]. The Hydra capability based
operating system [16] separated its access control mechanisms from the deﬁnition of its security policy. Follow up
operating system such as KeyKOS [11] and EROS [19] divide a secure system into compartments. Communication
between compartments is mediated by a reference monitor.
Our system creates distributed compartments using a centralized policy speciﬁcation.
Traditional ﬁrewall work [7] has focused on nodes and
enforcement mechanisms rather than overall system protection and policy coordination. There are however proposed ﬁrewall architectures [4, 13] that identify the need
for ﬂexible policy speciﬁcation and distribution. Our system reaches beyond networking, extending the set of services that participate in the security domain. Other work
that aims to aid the administrator in specifying policies for
VPNs can be found in [18, 17].

Figure 8. Policy allowing any user to access
the web server pages.
Authorizer: ADMINISTRATOR_KEY
Licensees: CGI1
Conditions: ((app_domain == "net access") &&
(src_addr == "Host1") &&
((dst_addr == "host2") ||
(dst_addr == "host3"))) -> "permit";
Authorizer: ADMINISTRATOR_KEY
Licensees: CGI1
Conditions: ((app_domain == "fs access") &&
(directory == "/www/cgi1data/*") &&
(permissions == "FULL_ACCESS")) -> "permit";
Authorizer: ADMINISTRATOR_KEY
Licensees: CGI1
Conditions: ((app_domain == "db access") &&
(records == "cgi1records) &&
(permissions == "FULL_ACCESS")) -> "permit";

Figure 9. Set of polices that apply to the CGI
script example from Section 3.1.

when we activated the VPS system.
We then simulated a large ﬁle transfer over the network
by FTP-ing a 100MB between the server and the client. In
this case the our system overhead dropped to less than %0.5
(11,131ms vs. 11,178ms). This reduction is expected, since
the cost imposed by our system (invoked once when the network connection is formed and once when the ﬁle is ﬁrst
accessed) is amortized over the entire ﬁle transfer.
For our ﬁnal experiment we used ab(8), the Apache
web server benchmarking tool. We run it for 500 requests
with concurrency 1 and 50, the ﬁle transferred was 1024
bytes of static HTML. The resulting overheads were of the
order of %1.

5 Concluding Remarks

4 Related Work

We argued that an increasing number of applications are
composed from heterogenous software components interconnected by a network, and that this model introduces new
security problems not easily addressed with a conventional
set of tools such as compartmented ﬁle systems and ﬁre-

System security for large scale distributed applications is
driven by the rapidly changing nature of those applications.
The environment we examine in this paper is one of hetero5
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walls. We proposed a new approach, Virtual Private Services, which uniﬁes the management of all access-control
enforcement points under a single global policy.
Our system copes with scale and heterogeneity, at a low
cost in usability, by converting this global policy into a form
in which it can be enforced locally. The impact on performance was evaluated using a prototype implementation
under the OpenBSD operating system in a series of microand macro-benchmarks selected to cover the space of uses
of the server side in a distributed application setting. Although our measurements are preliminary, we believe that
we have demonstrated that the performance impact of the
enforcement mechanism is expected to be low.
In Section 2, we listed four requirements for an effective
multi-layer security mechanism. Our system achieves three
of the four: we have a rich and extensible language to express policies, a reliable compilation and distribution mechanism of policies to enforcement points, and those policies
are completely enforceable. However, we do not feel that
our policy language is high-level enough. We intend to investigate the issue of a high-level policy deﬁnition language
in future research.
The performance analysis ignored the security advantages of virtual private services. We believe that our hypotheses, that is that the cost of the centralized policy speciﬁcation was low, and that the policy enforcement cost was
low, have been demonstrated. Better performance could be
gained through recoding and better cache management. Our
prototype was only deployed on two hosts as a proof of concept demonstration, we are however interested in deploying
the system in a realistic environment. The main goal of this
deployment would be investigating the larger-scale (and unfortunately more qualitative) question of the value of a consistent global policy in real systems.
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